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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GORnON A GRAY,
Appellant,

vs

Case No. 19005

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i ), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking
Judicial review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which denied unemployment benefits to the Appellant, Gordon
A. Gray, pursuant to Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
(Pocket Supplement, 1981),

on the

grounds that during

certain weeks for

which he claimed benefits he failed to demonstrate a "good faith" active
effort to seek employment as required for eligibility.

This disqualifica-

tion established an overpayment liability in the amount of $498, pursuant
r" SPction 35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supple'11c11t,

l 981).
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DISPOSITION BELOW
Appellant was denied unemployment benefits by a Department
tive pursuant to Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as arnrn,
(Pocket Supplement, 1981), effective August 29, 1982 and continuing, on,,,
grounds he did not make an active search for work as required for el igibi
ity.
$498.

This decision established an overpayment liability in the amount
Plaintiff appealed to an Appeal Referee who modified the decision a·

the Department Representative to deny benefits from August 29, 1982 throug''
October 30, 1982, with the exception of the weeks ended October 9 and 16,
1982, which

were

allowed,

and

affirmed the

overpayment

liability in tr·

amount of $498, by decision dated November 9, 1982, Case No.
an Amended

Decision dated

November 17, 1982, the Appeal

82-A-4423. :,

Referee affirmec

her prior decision dated November 9, 1982, with the exception of the termin·
ation date

of the denial which was amended to end October 23, 1982, witr

benefits allowed effective October 24, 1982 and a modification of the oHr
payment from $498 to $664.
the Industrial

The Appellant appealed to the Board of Reviewo'

Commission of Utah,

which

by decision, issued January 21,

1983, in Case No. 82-A-4423, 82-BR-534, affirmed the decision of the Appea:
Referee with

respect to the denial

of

benefits for the period August

1982 through October 23, 1982, with the exception of the calendar week endec
September 25, 1982 which was allowed by the Board of Review.
Review modified the decision of the Appeal
claimant for

the

calendar

week

ended

Referee to deny benefits to th.

October

- 2 -

The Board o'

9,

l 982.

The

ove rpayme'

, "'<I hy the Appeal
,, ·' Ill
'"'

11

Referee in the amount of $664 was

reduced by the

Review to $498 for the calendar weeks ended September 4, Septem-

and September 18, 1982, which overpayment has been offset by subseval id claims filed by the claimant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW

Appellant seeks a finding of the Court that the Appellant did in fact
make a diligent job search effort that demonstrated his continuing attachment to the labor market and such actions fully complied with requirements
of Utah law; that the Appellant be reimbursed of all benefits denied him;
and that the Department

be enjoined from terminating his claim again for

any reason other than exhaustion of benefits without first providing Appellant with the due process of law.

Respondent seeks affirmance of the

decision of the Board of Review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent substantially agrees with preliminary statement and statement of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, except in the following particulars, to wit:
In his preliminary statement at Page 4 of his Brief, Appellant states
tl1e Appeal

Referee "required that the overpayment of $498.00 be offset by

withholding 50% of Appellant's weekly benefit amount."
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However, the Appeal

Referee only recommended "that the Department consider exerc1s1ny r1 11 rr 1 ,
and permit offset

of not more than 50% of thP claimant's wPekly

1,,

amount." (R.0047)
Each unemployment insurance claimant is given an Unemployment ln<.ur,,,
Claimant Guide

(Referred

to

as

the

the time they apply for benefits.

Handbook
(R.0103)

hereafter)

{R.0167-0182)

Although, at the time of

h

hearing with the Appeals Referee, Appellant didn't "recognize" the Handbo"
(R.0092), he certified he had received one when he filed his initial clar
for benefits on June 4, 1982.

(R.0166)

At the same time, the Appellant wo

given a Form 601-D (R.0165) which he signed at the bottom, certifying he ha
read it and understood that
result in a denial

failure

of benefits.

to comply with

(R.0091)

Further,

its

provisions wou

the standard procedur.

of the claims interviewer, who interviewed the Appellant when he filed hi 1
claim, is to advise claimants to make two to three new in-person contact. 1
each week and keep "record in the back of the Handbook.

At the top of thr

page in the back of the Handbook where claimants are to record their week'!
job search efforts, the claims interviewer writes "two to three per week
and then has the claimant circle the printed words "in person."
0107)

{R.0106.

When Appellant first applied for unemployment benefits, he

was instructed "to make 2 job contacts a week on the job search."
and 0093)

(R.OOSJ

When he reopened his claim he was again instructed to keep h11

contacts active.

(R.0055)
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In August, 1982, the Appellant attended a veterans workshop at the Job
, 1

,1

''"'to receive instruction and assistance in regard to his search for

(R.Olll,0115,0118-0119)
Mr. Samuel

Smith,

Outreach Placement

the Job Service

Specialist

Interviewer and

Disabled

Veterans

(R.0112) who conducts the veterans workshops

(R.0114) testified that to find work a welder with the Appellant's experience needs to "knock on doors because the only people who are actually getting jobs are in the right place at the right time."
that making telephone
Appellant to find

contacts

is

not

an

He further testified

effective way

for

someone

work because "the way the labor market is you call

like
and

they automatically are going to say no if they have a position open because
they have

20 people

knock

Appellant's workshops.

on the doors."

This

advice was

given at the

(R.0122)

The Appellant received and read the claim cards, Form 603, (R.0183) as
he filled them out.

(R.0097)

After Appellant had been disqualified he made

up from memory the list of his job contacts found in the Record at R.01450153 and marked as Exhibit 9.

(R.0071)

Although denied benefits for the six weeks in question, such a denial
does not reduce the total amount of the Appellant's entitlement.
delays the

receipt

of

the

establishes his eligibility.

benefits to later weeks

in which the

(R.0010 and Addendum A)

It

should

It merely
claimant
be noted

that after the six week suspension of benefits, the claimant did receive, and

hn, continued to receive unemployment benefits to the present time.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Comm1ssion and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be
turbed.

Martinez v. Board of Review, 477 P. 2d 587 (Utah, 1970).

dis-

In tnt

case of Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 139
P. 2d 208, 211 (Utah, 1943), this Court held:
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the
findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this
court may not set aside the decision even though on a
review of the record we might well have reached a different result.
With specific reference to the question of availability, this Court hos
stated:
It is our duty to examine the record and to affirm the
decision unless we can say as a matter of law that the
conclusion on the question of "available for work" was
wrong because only the opposite conclusion could be
drawn from the facts. Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P. 2d 44,46
(Utah, 1966); citing Salt Lake County v. Industrial Commission, 120 P. 2d 321 (Utah, 1940).
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POI NT I I
Ill
I

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35-4-4(c), U.C.A. 1953, UTILIZED
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW AND IS REASONABLE.

The Appellant contends that the commission has applied in a rigid and
inflexible manner the so-called 2-3 new in-person contact rule."
quirement is,

however,

only an interpretive guideline that

That re-

is considered

viable in most occupations and areas, but is not applied rigidly or inflexiDly in all cases, nor has it been adopted as a formal general rule of adjudi cation.
Section 35-4-4{c) requires, by direct statutory language, that a claimant for unemployment insurance make an active and good faith effort to secure
employment each week that he files

for benefits.

The burden is upon the

claimant to prove he has met the requirements and conditions

for

benefit

payments, including of course the requirement that he has made the expected
work search effort.
cellaneous.

Rule A71-07-2:1.b, General Rules of Adjudication, Mis-

Although the Utah Employment Security Act does not require that

a claimant be engaged in a search for work for any given number of hours
each day or week to prove he is engaged in an active good faith search, this
Court has held that a claimant must be unequivocally exposed to the labor
market and must

show more than a passive willingness to gain employment.

Qe_n_bt v. Board of Review, 567 P. 2d 626 (Utah, 1977); Gocke, supra.

Thus,

the question of whether or not a claimant has engaged in a good faith active
'earch for work is a mixed question of law and fact.
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With Utah unemployment compensation claims as high as 35,000

nur»

particular week, and in recognition of the difficulty involved in the p1 ,w,
adjudication and payment week by week of benefits, the Legislature gave,
the Industrial Commission regulatory powers specifying that claims must
filed in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Commission,
Rule

A71-07-2:2.c.(7),

General Rules

of Adjudication,

supra, pro

vi des:
Inasmuch as each claimant is advised of his rights and
responsibilities at the beginning of his claim series
and since he certifies to eligibility requirements when
continuing his claims, he should have sufficient knowledge to put him on notice that certain subjects might be
important factors relative to a claim for benefits. The
claimant is then under obligation to make proper inquiry
and failure to do so constitutes fault.
When Appellant initially filed for benefits, he was given the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide and certified to the following statement on
his initial claim form:
understand that I must personally seek work and be able
and available to accept full-time work. I have received
the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide explaining my
rights and responsibilities. (R.0166)
The Unemployment Insurance Guide provides:
Make an active effort to look for work. An active effort
means that you should contact several employers in eerson each week who would hire people in your occupational
field. (R.0176, Emphasis added)
"Several" obviously means more than one.
Appellant also signed and received a copy of the "Responsibilities While
Claiming Benefits" form which provides:
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SPek work - I must make an active effort to look for
tul l time work each week and will follow up on any job
leads I am given by Job Service. An active effort, in
part, means I will personally contact emrloyers who
would hire people in my occupation. Fai ure to do so
may be considered as evidence that I do not have a
genuine desire to find immediate employment. (R.0165,
Emphasis added)
Mr. Samuel Smith, a Department Representative, with over seven years'
experience as a Placement-Interviewer, who testified to his familiarity with
the labor market for welders, and who has taught job search workshops for
the Department, (R.0112-0114) testified to the need and reason for requiring
in-person contacts as follows:
Referee:

think that calls for an evaluation of this
particular claimant. Let's rephrase the question and ask what should a welder do with
Mr. Gray's experience be doing to try to find
work?

Smith:

He would be considered a journeyman. The best
thing he can do would be just knock on doors.
Because the only people who are actually getting jobs are in the right place at the right
time.

Referee:

Is making telephone contacts a good way for
someone like Mr. Gray to obtain employment?

Smith:

Presently, no. Because 90 percent, unless you
have got a contact. But right now the way the
labor market is you call and they automatically
are going to say no if they have a position
open because they have 20 people knock on the
doors.

Referee:

Do you advise the people in your workshops, do
you tell them this?

Smith:

Yes.

Referee:

Do you tell them what you just told me?
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Smith:

Yes.

Referee:

So you tell them to go out and knock on doors
and to take their resume and to fill it out
with the appplication and staple it on the
front of the application?

Smith:

Right.

(R.0122)

This Court affirmed that the Department has the authority to make interpretations of the Employment Security Act in areas of mixed questions of tau
and law.

In the case of Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board of Review of the

Industrial Commission of Utah and Marian Lynch, 657 P. 2d 1312, {Utah, 19811.
this Court stated:
In administrative law cases, our scope of review of an
agency's decisions as to legal questions and questions
of mixed law and fact is generally broader than our scope
of review of questions of fact. On most questions of
statutory construction, with some exceptions, our review
is plenary with no deference accorded the administrative
determination. That standard is particularly applicable
with respect to constitutional law issues. However,
where the language of a statute indicates a legislative
intention to commit broad discretion to an agency to effectuate the purposes of the legislative scheme, we will
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency as
long as the commission's interpretation has "warrant in
the record" and a "reasonable basis in the law." Unemployment Com)ensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.s:-143,
153-54 (1946 ; National labor Relations Board v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. lll, 131 (1944). Furthermore, where agency decisions deal with technical questions which call for the exercise of expertise, born
either of a technical background and training or long
experience in dealing with numerous, similar problems,
we also accord deference to an agency interpretation
because of the necessity to recognize discretion commensurate with the nature of the issue, as defined by the
general purposes of the Act, although the latitude
accorded may vary with the nature of the issue. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1946), provides an example. The statutory language required that before the

- l0 -

Commission could give approval to a plan of reorganization of a utility holding company, the Commission was
required to determine among other things that the plan
was "fair and equitable." 332 U.S. at 204. The standard of review under such legal criteria was based on
deference to the "informed discretion" of the Commission and permitted reversal of the Commission's ruling
only upon a plain abuse of its discretion. Id. at 208.
[ 6 5 7 P • 2d , at l 31 6.]
The minimal requirement placed upon claimants to contact 2-3 potential
employers each week in person is reasonable and is supported by case law
from other jurisdictions.

For example, in Carr v. Administrator, Unemploy-

ment Compensation Act, 223 A. 2d 313 (Conn., 1966), the Commission was held
to have acted reasonably in finding that the claimant had not made a reasonable effort to look for work when he contacted only one or two places a week.
See also

Jones

v.

Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 228 A. 2d

807 (Conn., 1966); Redd v. Texas Employment Commission, 431 S.W. 2d 16 (Tx.,
1968).

And in Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 922 (Conn., 1973), cited on

pages 22 and 24 of Appellant's Brief, the United Stated District Court for
the District of Connecticut stated, contrary to the assertions of the Appel!ant, as follows:
[l]f a stated number of employers must be visited, a
claimant's acknowledgement that he had seen fewer than
the required number would eliminate the factual controversy and provide an adequate basis for denial of
benefits.
Considering the purpose of the work search requirement, the testimony of
an experienced Department Placement Interviewer that most jobs are obtained
by job seekers through personal contact, and the requirement of Denby v. _!.!!.:_
Justrial Commission, supra, that a claimant must be unequivically exposed to
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the labor market, the

requirement of

2-3 in-person contacts each

WPP'

reasonable and consistent with the generalized work-search requirPinrnl"
tained in the Act.
POINT I I I
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR
IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THE WORK SEARCH
REQUIREMENTS FOR ELIGIBILITY AND THUS WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR
WORK, AND THIS DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Appe 11 ant has misperceived the 2-3 new in-person contact requirement.
Contrary to Appellant's assertion that the requirement is applied rigidly and
inflexibly, it is

utilized as a guideline by Department Representatives

determining eligibility.

in

In the instant case the claimant was given written

instructions, as set forth in Point II herein, concerning the requirement
to make an active and good faith effort to find work by personally contacting employers.
Consistent with the written instructions given to the Appellant, the
Appellant admitted that he was initially told by a Department Representative
" • • • to make two job contacts a week on the job search."

(R.0054)

Com-

menting on the instructions given to claimants by the Department
tive who

handled the

Appellant's

claim,

Roger

Slagowski,

the

supervisor testified:
Slagowski:

She said "I advise the claimant to make
two to three new in-person contacts each
week and keep records in the back of the
Claimant Handbook" and she said "at the
top inside of the book of the Claimant
Handbook, where it shows work-search record,
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claimant's

I write two to three per week" and down on
the form it has the type of contacts
she has them circled in-person.
Referee:

So she, in addition to what the Claimant
Guide says, writes on that form "make
two to three contacts a week" and circles
in-person?

Slagowski:

That is correct.

(R.0106)

Aµpellant's Attorney stipulated to this testimony by Mr. Slagowski.
When the

claimant

reopened his

(R.0104)

claim for benefits in August, he was

again instructed to keep his contacts active.

(R.0055)

Finally, the claim-

ant attended a Job Search Work Shop in August, at which he was instructed to
contact employers in person because telephoning was not productive.
Despite the written instructions
standard oral

(R.0122)

received by the claimant and, presumably,

instructions by the claims interviewer (R.0106), and despite

the instruction

given

at

the

workshop

(R.0123),

Appellant

claimed he had

not been instructed to make two to three new in-person contacts each week.
(R.0163,0100,0086)
It seems

unlikely that the

claims

interviewer would have changed her

standard instructions to claimants when interviewing the Appellant as he suggests.

(R.0086)

from complying

Further, Appellant acknowledged that nothing prevented him

with the

instruction to

ThP claimant could read and write.

make in-person

(R.0097,0145-0152)

contacts.

(R.0131)

He can't claim that

he was hurried in the claim filing process or that he was not provided the
opportunity to read and understand what he was filing as he was given the
,,e,-essary papers on Friday and did not actually file his benefit claim until
th" toll owi ng Monday.

( R. 0094)
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Appellant's apparent

failure to

read

the documents or to

follow!'

verbal instructions given to him does not excuse him from making the r·!''i'J'
work search.

It is because of this serious responsibility that claimants,,

required to sign certifications that they have received and have been,,
structed to read these documents.
sibility of a denial

Claimants are also told there is the p01 _

of benefits and penalties for failing to comply witn

instructions from the Department.

(R.0163,0165,0166,0176,0183)

The record shows that the Appellant made only one new in-person contact between August 29, 1982 and September 4, 1982 (R.0063), only one new
in-person contact during the two weeks between September 5, 1982 and September 18, 1982, (R.0074) and

no

October for

denied

which

he

was

in-person contacts for the three weeks ir
benefits,

(R.0144,0150,0151,0153)

even

though he signed a statement on September 27, 1982, which stated in part,
"! now know I must make two to three new in-person contacts each week or

benefits could be denied."

(R.0163)

This

fact

situation appears almost

analogous to the situation in Marvin L. Hurd v. Board of Review, 638 P. 1d
544 (Utah, 1981 ), wherein this Court held that a claimant, who had contacted
only three businesses for the purpose of finding work during a 30 day period,
was not entitled to unemployment

compensation because his efforts showed

only "a passive search for work" even though he alleged in his appeal to the
Board of Review that he had made "numerous telephone cal ls pursuant to want
ad listings."

638 P. 2d at 545.
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,lust as the
"•d'J

with

Appellant

potential

was

instructed to make at least two in-person

employers,

Appellant

was

also instructed when

he

,,,,1 HI ly reopened his claim to keep an accurate record of his job contacts.
1 1:.0lb2,0l65,0176)

lant's Attorney,

Pursuant to a letter from the Appeal
dated

October

19,

1982

(R.0154),

Referee to Appel-

Appellant

provided

a

list of all employers he had allegedly contacted after he reopened his claim
for benefits on August 19, 1982.

(R.0144-0153)

However, this list which was

admittedly begun after September 29, 1982 (R.0071) was made only to the best
of Appellant's

recollection

(R.0071,0llO);

conflicts with other papers he

filed (R.0162); and conflicts with his own testimony.

For example, Appellant

lists that he filed applications with Ashby Metals, Mark Steel, and Allen
Steel between September 4, 1982 and September 25, 1982.

(R.0145-0146)

The

record shows, however, that app l i cat i ans with Ashby Metals and Mark Steel
were submitted in June, 1982 (R.0060,0062) and the application with Allen
"is about nine years old."

(R.0065)

made in-person

eight

(R.0144)

contacts

at

Likewise, Appellant's list claims he

businesses

after

reopening

his

claim.

However, his testimony indicates that at least four of those bus-

inesses were only contacted by telephone.
Such sporatic employer contacts, the

(R.0062,0065,0058)
failure to maintain an accurate

rPcord, and particularly the failure to pursue in-person contacts after such
explicit instructions, are inconsistent with an unequivocal exposure to the
labor market and justify the denial of benefits in this case.
Appellant relies on Gocke, supra as support for his contention that his
search was adequate.

See pages 15 and 16 of Appellant's Brief.

- 15 -

However,

Gocke is distinguishable in that the claimant therein was not advisP<i ,,.
the extent of work search she should be making.

The claimant in G_ock_e

tPI

on the "Handbook for Claimants" which, when read literally, "doesn't
any affirmative action by a claimant other than registration."

•le.

In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that Appellant was adVli
ed as to the extent of work search he should be making and there can be nc
doubt that he knew, or should have known, what constituted an active effw
to secure employment.
In applying the 2-3 new in-person contact requirement as a guideline
considering the

claimant's

eligibility

for

benefits,

the

Board

1n

of Review

looked at the totality of the claimant's efforts to find work, as evidencea
by the

following

statement

from

the

decision

of

the

Board

of

Review·

In modifying the decision of the Appeal Referee to deny
benefits for the calendar week ended October 9, 1982 and
to allow benefits for the calendar week ended September 25, 1982, the Board of Review notes that for the calender week ended September 25, 1982 the claimant had made
one in-person employer contact, supplemented by telephone
contacts. However, during the calendar week ended October 9, 1982, all employer contacts were made by telephone. As indicated in the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide, telephone calls may be an effective way to
develop leads to employes who have jobs in a claimant's
occupational field. However, telephone calls alone are
insufficient to demonstrate a "good faith" "active effort
to secure employment." (R.0012-0013, Emphasis added)
Thus, although the

claimant made

ended September 25, 1982, that
tacts.

only

contact

one in-person

contact for the wee<

was supplemented by telephone con·

In contrast, the claimant's efforts to find work in prior weeks were

limited to one in-person contact per week, or even less.

- l6 -

Also in contrast.

,1a1mant's employer contacts during the calendar week ended October 9,

1l1e
'!"/

were al I made by telephone.

', 1q1hune

cal ls alone are insufficient to demonstrate a good faith active

1ttort to secure employment.
is

The Board of Review specifically held that

Again, the reason for this latter conclusion

the necessity of each claimant to be inequivocally exposed to the labor

market.

A claimant who does not have applications on file with those em-

ployers who are willing to accept applications, or who have not made personal
contact with employers, is far less likely to be called for work by an employer who develops a job opening.
In summary, the requirement of 2-3 in-person contacts is not an inflexible rule, but rather, is a guideline for evaluating a claimant's work search
efforts.

The necessity for one who claims the benefits of the unemployment

insurance program to expose himself to the labor market by a combination of
in-person contacts and other work search efforts is obvious, and the Department's requirements of such efforts and the maintenance of a record to evidence such efforts are reasonable requirements consistent with the intent
and purposes of the Utah Employment Security Act.
POINT IV
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE COMMISSION TERMINATED UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS TO CLAIMANT GRAY DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
Appellant contends in his Brief at Point IV that he was denied unemployment benefits without prior notice and without opportunity for a Goldberg
v. Ke_l_l_,r type of hearing before termination of benefits.

- l7 -

In support of this

contention claimant cites the cases of

v.

_5.LJ_p_r_a, and(;

fornia Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1%
Appellant explains the Fusari
system did

not

provide

case as holding that the "seated interv 1c,

sufficient procedural

unemployment insurance claimants.

due process protect ions foe

A cursory review of the District Courr

Opinion would lead one to that conclusion.

The District Court held that

the Connecticut procedures for determining unemployment insurance eligibilili
violated due process as follows:
. • • because (a) a property interest has been denied
(b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewable
de novo until an unreasonable length of time. 364 F.
Supp., at 937-938.
The Connecticut legislature thereafter amended the review provisioITT 0
its unemployment insurance law.

The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case

to the District Court to determine whether the new provisions improved the
time factor sufficiently to make the entire process legally sufficient, stati ng:

Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an
opportunity for consideration and correction of errors
made in initial eligibility determinations. 95 S.Ct.,
at 540.
Thus a careful

reading of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the

case clearly shows that the Court was primarily concerned with the length of
delay in obtaining proper review of a denial of benefits.
subsequently specifically recognized

by the Supreme Court

This concern was
in the case of

Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing Fusari at 906.

- 18 -

,11',dt,1lity insurance case, involved the precise issue to which Appellant
111 Point IV of his Brief, that is, whether an individual claiming
"""'rr11nent benefits under an entitlement program may be denied such benet11, without a Goldberg v.

hearing.

In analyzing the issue presented, the Eldridge court set forth the
factors to be considered in determining the amount of due process required
in such cases, as follows:
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and
private interests that are affected. [Citations omitted]
More precisely our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or a substitute
procedural safeguard; and finally, the government's
interests, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Citing
Goldberg v.
The Court then proceeded to analyze the individual

interest involved

in the Eldridge case, stating:
Only in Goldberg has the court held that due process
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence; "the crucial factor in this context a factor not present in the case of . . • virtually
anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits. 397 U.S., at 264, 90 s.c. at 1018 (Emphasis
in original)." Eligibility for disability benefits,
- 19 -

in contrast, is not based upon financial need. Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or
support from many other sources, such as earnings of
other family members, workmen's compensation awards,
court claims awards, savings, private insurance, public
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps,
public assistance, or the "many other important programs both public and private, which contain provisions
for disability payments affecting a substantial portion
of the work force.
" [Footnotes and Citations
omitted. 96 S.Ct., at 905]
After considering the

other two factors

court concluded that an evidentiary hearing

previously referred to, the
is

not

required prior to the

termination of disability benefits.
The holding that pre-termination evidentiary hearings are not requirec
was extended to unemployment insurance cases by Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F.1.
40 (E.D. Mo.), affirmed 431 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2164, 53 L.Ed. 2d 220 (1977).
See also Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 333 F .s. 431 (S.D.N.Y.,
1971), affirmed

405

U.S.

949,

92

S.Ct.

1185,

31

L.Ed.

2d

228

(1972).

Appellant's reliance on California Department of Human Resources Develop
ment v. Java, supra, is likewise misplaced.

The Java case involved a proce·

dure whereby an employer could sit back and await an initial determination
of a claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits.

If the determination

found the claimant eligible, the employer could then appeal, thus causing the
termination of the claimant's benefits pending the outcome of the employer's
appeal.

Such appeals took a median of seven to ten weeks to resolve.

The

U.S. Supreme Court held in Java that the suspension of unemployment benefits
for such

a

lengthy

period,

after an initial determination of

- 20 -

1111,;ted due
11•·l1ts was

process.

In the instant case the termination of Appellent's

not initiated by an appeal

of another party, but rather was

1,ased on the claimant's own statements in an eligibility review.
11163).

(R.0162-

The eligibility review is an administrative device by which benefit

claimants are periodically asked to prove their eligibility consistent with
Rule A71-07-2:1.e.(l), General Rules of Adjudication,

supra.

Appellent was

notified of the eligibility review and appeared as requested by the local
office.

(R.0161-0163)

Thereafter Appellant received a notice of denial

benefits which he appealed in a timely manner to an Appeal Referee.
0157-0158)

of

(R.0160-

Appellant was given a notice of the appeal hearing setting forth

the time, date, place and issues to be covered.

(R.0155)

As required by

Section 35-4-10, U.C.A. 1953, Appellant was given a full evidentiary hearing
and a decision was issued to him within six weeks from the date he was denied
benefits (R.0148,0160) and only four weeks from the date of his appeal to the
Referee.

(R.0156)

This procedure afforded Appellant the full due process

of law required by Eldridge.
POI NT V
RECOVERING APPELLANT'S OVERPAYMENT BY DEDUCTING 100% OF APPELLANT'S UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT CHECK WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND IS EXPRESSLY REQUIRED BY THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
Appellant claims the Department abused its discretion in ordering 100%
of his weekly benefits withheld in order to recoup the overpayment.
tiff's Brief, Page 20.

Plain-

Plaintiff cites Section 70B-5-105, Utah Code Annotat-

'"1 19"3, for the proposition that "generally one's wages cannot be garnished
- 21 -

in exceeds of 25% of weekly disposable earnings or to an extent that
drop the

debtors

wages

below minimum wage."

Plaintiff's

1t

"'

Brief, Paye

However, Section 708-5-105 is not applicable to recoupment of unemployme"
benefits as it only applies to "rights arising from consumer credit salei,
consumer lease, and consumer loans.

Section 708-5-112, Utah Code

Annotated 1953.
The applicable statute in this instance is Section 35-4-6(d) of the Utar

1

Employment Security Act which provides in pertinent part:
If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received
any sum as benefits under this act to which under a redetermination or decision pursuant to this section, he
has been found not entitled, he shall be liable to repay
such sum, and or shall, in the discretion of the commission, be liable taliaVe such sum deducted from an future
benefits paya e to
mp asis added
At first blush the above language from the code would appear to give
the commission discretion as to whether or not to recoup an overpayment by
deduction from future benefits and, therefore, to support Appellant's contention that less than a 100% deduction would be permissable;

however, it

should be noted that there is no discretion as to whether the claimant
repay the overpayment.

The above Sect ion 35-4-6(d) of the Act goes on to

say:
In any case in which under this subsection a claimant
is liable to repay to the commission any sum for the
fund, such sum shall be collectible in the same manner
as provided for contributions due under this act.
Thus the commission's discretion appears to be limited to allowing the
overpayment to be deducted from future benefits as opposed to requiring

- 22 -

J

"l"\'111Pnt

in

cash.

'""' 1<1Ned that

Having exercised that discretion, the Respondent has

it must

recoup the overpayment from

µdyable to the claimant."

future benefits

(Emphasis added)

It should be noted in this regard that where a claimant has received
benefits to which he was not entitled, a 100% recoupment leaves him in no
worse a position than he would have been in had he not received the overpayment in the first place.

In fact, since no interest is added, the claim-

ant has had free use of money to which he was not entitled until it is in
fact recouped.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent has established 2-3 new in-person employer contacts as
a minimum interpretive guideline by which to consider whether a claimant has
"acted in good faith in an active effort to security employment" as required
by Section 35-4-4(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act.

The work search

of claimants who fail to meet the minimum guideline are closely scrutinized
to determine whether under all the circumstances of the particular claimant
it can be concluded he/she has "acted in good faith in an active effort to
secure employment."

This method of monitoring the work search efforts of

claimants is both reasonable and consistent with the intent and purpose of
the Utah Employment Security Act.
Even though

he

was

given

an

Unemployment

Insurance

Claimant

Guide

when he applied for benefits, which gives instructions in simple, layman's
la11guage and has

space wherein

claimants are instructed to record their

- 23 -

contacts, this claimant made a written record of his contacts only
was initially denied benefits.

aftei

Even though he was instructed that telepi 11 ,

ing was not an effective means of finding employment in his occupation,,
persisted in using the telephone as his principle method of searching fr,,
work.

Therefore, the Appellant failed in meeting his burden of showing ac

active, good

faith

effort

to secure employment

during the six weeks fer

which he was denied benefits.
Upon receiving Appellant's appeal from the termination of his benefits,
based on information he gave at an eligibility review, the commission gavE
the Appellant a timely, full evidentiary hearing, after notice, at which
was represented by counsel.

hE

This procedure afforded Appellant the full due

process of law.
Rather than requiring the Appellant to repay his overpayment in cash,
the Respondent all owed Appellant to repay his overpayment by deduction from
future benefits as expressly provided in the Utah Employment Security Act.
This method of recoupment left the Appellant in no worse position than he
would have

been had

he not

received the overpayment

Respondent submits that the decision

of the Board

in the first place.
of Review is sup·

ported by substantial competent evidence; is consistent with the intent and
purposes of the

Utah Employment

Security

affirmed by this Court.

- 24 -

Act;

and

should,

therefore, be

llp<;pectful ly submitted this 3rd day of June, 1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistant

Attorney

General

Lorin R. Blauer
Legal Counsel
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